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Federalism and Accountability:
State Attorneys General, Regulatory
Litigation, and the New Federalism
Timothy Meyert

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Supreme Court has resurrected judicially-enforced
limits on federal power. In a series of landmark rulings, including, among
1
others, United States v. Lopez,' United
States v. Morrison,2 and New York v.
United States,3 the Court has relied on two fundamental ideas to reduce the
power of Congress to regulate the states: that the federal government is a
government of limited, enumerated powers, and that the states are the
repositories of residual powers. Part of the justification for this constitutional
movement is that limits on federal power protect the "distribution of power
fundamental to our federalist system of government." 4 This balance of power,
in turn, is linked to a conception of democratic accountability, which suggests
that, at least in some instances, federal regulation is less directly accountable to
citizens than state regulation. 5 In reality, however, the relationship between
federal power, state power, and democratic accountability is considerably more
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1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
3. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
4. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42, (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
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complicated. In the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, state
institutions with lower transaction costs can pursue their own regulatory
agendas, even when those agendas have significant national ramifications. The
result is that where a subset of states cooperates on a regulatory policy, other
states may be subjected to that policy's effect without having any influence
over the policymaking process. Such a situation puts the values of federalism
and democratic accountability in tension with each other.
This Comment will examine how one particular state institution, state
attorneys general (SAGs), has operated within a unique set of institutional and
political constraints to create state-based regulation with nationwide impact in
policy areas including consumer protection, 6 antitrust, 7 environmental
regulation, 8 and securities regulation. 9 This state-based regulation casts doubt
on one of the principle rationales advanced in the Supreme Court's anticommandeering line of cases for limiting federal power; namely, that such a
move enhances electoral accountability,' 0 a concept central to our democracy.
If in the absence of federal regulation a series of narrowly accountable statebased actors can create nationwide regulation in a non-legislative fashion,
accountability cannot continue to be a coherent justification for a revival of
judicially-enforced federalism. While this critique of accountability is not an
argument for untrammeled federal regulatory authority, it does call into
question the empirical accuracy of the Court's assumptions about how state and
federal institutions interact with each other to promote democratic and
constitutional values.
In order to understand how SAGs have used litigation to become a
regulatory force at the national level, it is important to identify the institutional,
political, and legal factors that generate cooperation among these fifty state
institutions." These many officers are responsive to different political
pressures, and have different personal, political, and policy goals. At first
glance, it is perhaps surprising that a cooperative regulatory strategy could

6. See Jason Lynch. Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys
Generalin MultistateLitigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2003 (2001) (noting that traditionally
SAGs exercised their litigation authority to bring intrastate consumer protection suits).
7. See Michael S. Greve, CartelFederalism?Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys
General,72 CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005).
8. See The Role of State Attorneys General in Environmental Regulation, 30 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 335, 342-43 (2005) [hereinafter The Role of Attorneys General] (describing
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. filed July
21, 2004), a multistate suit aimed at reducing the harmful emissions by power plants).
9. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 145 (2006) (describing how
former New York Attorney General used litigation as a tool to force reform in the financial
services industry).
10. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
11.
There are in fact more than fifty, if one counts the attorneys general of the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other American territories.
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emerge from the interaction of so many diverse actors. 12 It should be even
more surprising that it has happened not once, but many times and in a number
of different substantive areas. Recognizing how such cooperation and
regulation emerges will help us to understand more about the nature of our
federal system and help us to make normative recommendations about the
proper role of the judiciary in refereeing disputes between the state and federal
governments.
This Comment will proceed in five parts. Part I will briefly review the
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence in the last fifteen years, focusing on
the accountability rationale for limiting the power of the federal government.
The next three parts will examine the political and institutional environment
that permits SAGs to cooperate in regulatory litigation. Part II examines the
state-based institutional constraints under which SAGs typically operate. While
SAGs have much in common with each other, the variations in these structures
between states will in part account for the actual way in which any given SAG
regulatory scheme evolves. Part III draws on empirical work by political
scientists to explore the ideas developed in Part II in the context of the tobacco
litigation of the 1990's. Part III also begins the discussion of the incentives for
SAGs to cooperate with each other. Part IV expands on the federal dimension
of SAG cooperation.
Finally, Part V argues that the use of regulation through litigation by
SAGs undermines democratic accountability in at least two ways. First,
regulation by a group of states that has nationwide effects denies the citizens of
other states the opportunity to influence the regulatory process. This denial of
political access undercuts the accountability rationale. Second, regulation
accomplished through litigation is more difficult to overturn than regulation
accomplished through legislative or administrative channels, making it less
responsive to political changes. Thus, SAG regulation can be less politically
accountable over time, as well as across states.
I
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE

The reinvigoration of judicially-enforced limits on federal power is a
reversal of the position that the Court had held for nearly sixty years: that the
constitutional structures of the federal government provide a method of
politically regulating the relationship between the states and the federal

12. Throughout this Comment, the term "regulation" is used to refer to litigation of SAGs
that has consequences for the ways in which business organizations and industries operate. While
this litigation is not necessarily regulation in the administrative sense, its effect is to alter the
behavior of corporations and business organizations in the same way that administrative actions
do. It is for this reason that a variety of scholars have referred to lawsuits designed to change the
way businesses operate as "regulation through litigation," or other similar names. See, e.g.,
REGULATION THROUGHi LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
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government. Under this view, whose chief advocate was Professor Herbert
Wechsler, 13 the relationship between the states and the federal government was
not the proper subject of judicial regulation. Justice Blackmun most forcefully
embraced this position on behalf of the Court when he wrote:
[The] principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself . . . State sovereign interests, then, are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of
the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
14
power.
Nevertheless, the Rehnquist Court reestablished judicially-enforced limits
15
later. In cases such as United States v. Lopez
on federal power only a decade
• 16
and United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court cut back on congressional
power to regulate the states under the Commerce Clause.' 7 In Lopez, the Court
struck down as beyond Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause the
Gun-Free School Zone Act, 18 while in Morrison the Court struck down the
civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act for lack of
Congressional authority under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19Similarly, in finding the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
unconstitutional, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores20 introduced a judicially
enforced "congruence and proportionality" test to determine whether
congressional regulation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
constitutionally permissible.
Finally, and most relevant to the analysis in this Comment, in a line of
cases including New York v. United States2 1 and Printz v. United States, 22 the
Supreme Court propounded the "anti-commandeering" principle. Under this
doctrine, the federal government may not order state legislatures or state
executive officers to enact federal regulatory programs because "where the
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state
and federal officials is diminished., 23 As Justice O'Connor explained:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the

13. See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
14. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550, 552 (1985).
15. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16. See 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
17. But cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the application of the
federal Controlled Substances Act to intrastate growers and users of marijuana does not violate the
Commerce Clause).
18. 514 U.S. at 551.
19. 529 U.S. at 601.
20. See 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
21. See505 U.S. 144 (1992).
22. See521 U.S. 898 (1997).
23. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
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benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,
or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To
the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and
24
state governments for the protection of individuals.
Thus, in New York, the Court invalidated, on the grounds that it usurped the
proper role of the states and was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment,
provisions of a state-negotiated and Congressionally-enacted pact requiring
25
states under certain circumstances to take title to low-level radioactive waste.
Similarly, in Printz, the Court found unconstitutional provisions of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring 26state officers to execute
background checks on prospective gun purchasers.
Yet it is unclear the degree to which justiciable limits on federal power
necessarily promote the democratic accountability that is said to justify judicial
intervention in these cases. Particularly in situations similar to New York, in
which the federal regulation is the result of a state-led effort to solve an interstate problem, 27 permitting federal regulation may actually enhance the
accountability of policy, not necessarily as an absolute matter, but relative to
the policies that may emerge in the absence of federal regulation. Indeed, this
Comment suggests that a doctrine of federalism that is judicially enforceable in
some circumstances shifts the locus of state-federal relationships to the
courtroom. The effect is to empower a set of state officers who are only
narrowly accountable to use litigation to regulate on a national scale. Instead of
regulation reflecting the plurality of interests represented in legislative or
administrative proceedings, massive regulatory efforts occur in the shadow of
the courtroom, with limited input from affected political constituencies.
The rise of SAGs as a regulatory institution in the last twenty years is
most obvious in the case of the tobacco litigation, but has also occurred in areas
such as securities regulation, environmental regulation, and consumer
protection. 28 For example, between 1995 and 1997 SAGs reached multi-state
settlements requiring the cessation of illegal activities and the payment of
damages in suits against America Online, American Cyanamid, Bausch &
Lomb, General Motors, Louisiana Pacific, Mazda, Packard Bell, and Sears
Roebuck. 29 The legal, political, and institutional factors, both at the state and
federal level, that have led to the increased importance of this institution (or
rather fifty institutions) are worth studying because they give us an insight into
the degree to which the Court's view of federalism as a source of greater

24. Id. at 181.
25. 505 U.S. at 175.
26. 521 U.S. at 934.
27. 505 U.S. at 151 (noting that the statute at issue was based on a proposal from the
National Governor's Association).
28. See supra notes 7-10.
29. Lynch, supra note 6, at 2006.
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political accountability is theoretically and empirically accurate. If a federal
system in which limits on the federal government are judicially enforced does
not necessarily enhance democratic accountability, as this Comment argues,
one must identify other justifications for those limits.
II
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

This Part describes the legal, political, and institutional factors at the state
level that affect SAGs' discretion and incentives to act entrepreneurially in
pursuing regulation through litigation.
A. FoundationsofAutonomy for State Attorneys General
The office of the attorney general is derived from the similar English
office that existed during colonial times. Colonial attorneys general represented
the Crown's interests in colonial courts. Following the Revolution, the office
was reestablished by individual state constitutions or statutes. Today, fortythree state attorneys general are elected, five (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Wyoming) are appointed by the governor, one (Maine) is
elected by a secret ballot of the state legislature, and the last (Tennessee) is
appointed by the state supreme court. 31 The National Association of Attorneys
General identifies five functions that the office performs: "(1) rendering
advisory opinions on questions of law to government officials; (2) representing
the state's legal interests... ; (3) drafting and promoting legislative proposals;
(4) administering certain types of state expenditures in areas such as
contracting and state bonding; and (5) disseminating information regarding
32
legal issues confronting the state."
The heart of the attorney general's power is found in the constitutional
and statutory arrangements that create the office. Although the exact allocation
of litigation authority varies from state to state, attorneys general, for the most
part, have a monopoly, or a near monopoly, on the state executive branch's
access to the courtroom. 33 This means that litigation as a method to advance
policy interests is a tool that rests almost exclusively in the hands of the
attorney general. Furthermore, because the attorney general is responsible for
defending other state agencies in court, he may also be able to shape the
34
policies of other state agencies with which he has no hierarchical relationship.

30. Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism:State Attorneys General
as NationalPolicymakers, 56 THE REVIEW OF POLITIcs 525, 527 (1994).
31.
Lynch, supranote 6, at 2002.
32.
Clayton, supra note 30, at 528.
33.
Lynch, supra note 6, at 2003.
34.
This monopoly on access to the courtroom is similar the Justice Department's near
monopoly over litigation in the federal government. See DONALD HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY:
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 5 (1977).
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For example, during his years as New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer
frequently clashed with David Grandeau, executive director of New York's
lobbying commission. 35 In at least one instance, Grandeau publicly accused
Spitzer's office of refusing to adopt the commission's preferred interpretation
of lobbying laws in
court, thereby undercutting its efforts to regulate a wider
36
range of activities.
SAG autonomy is ingrained not only in statutory and state constitutional
provisions, but also in the common law. As the Fifth Circuit explained:
The attorneys general of our states have enjoyed a significant degree of
autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not exhaustively
defined by either constitution or statute but include all those exercised
at common law. There is and has been no doubt that the legislature
may deprive the attorney general of specific powers; but in the absence
of such legislative action, he tpically may exercise all such authority
as the public interest requires.
Autonomy (or in other words a lack of accountability) can be thought of as
freedom from retaliation by other actors in response to actions that the other
actors dislike. In the literature on agency-Congress or Court-Congress relations,
spatial models are commonly used to describe this concept. 38 In these models,
Congress has an ideal policy position, but has delegated responsibility to either
an agency or court for choosing the specific policy (legal or otherwise) that will
be implemented. 39 A legislative choice of policy is costly to Congress in terms
of time and resources consumed, as well as bargaining costs necessary to create
a majority in both houses in favor of a particular policy. 40 The degree of
discretion that agencies or courts have in selecting policy is thus determined by
the size of the costs to Congress of directly implementing its preferred policy.
The agency or court has discretion within bounds that are determined by
Congress' "indifference" points. Between the two indifference points, the

35.

See, e.g., Al Baker, Brief Unity Turns To Discord in Feud Over Lobbying Laws, NEW

YORK TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at B6.; Raymond Hemandez, In New York, A Record Fine Over

Lobbying, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 13, 1999, at Al.
36. Al Baker, Two State Agencies Become Embroiled in a Dust-Up Over Lobbying Rules,
NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 29, 2003, at B3.

37. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1976).
38. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 311-12
(2005) (describing the history of the use of spatial models to study interbranch relations).
39. John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12
INTER'L REV. L. & EcON. 263, 268 (1992).
40. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure andProcess,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA.
L. REV. 431, 433-34 (1989) (noting that in principal-agent theory, it is costly to a principal to
monitor and enforce promises made by the agent); see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 962, 974 (2002) (noting that higher transaction costs make overturning judicial action more
difficult).
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agency/court is free to choose its own most preferred policy, and thus deviate
from Congress' ideal policy, because the cost to Congress of correcting the
agency or judicial action exceeds the marginal benefit from the improvement in
policy. Outside the indifference points, Congress' marginal benefit from
moving policy back to its ideal point exceeds its costs, and thus agency/court
discretion is cabined.
B. Executive, Legislative, and PoliticalConstraintson SAGs

Adapting this spatial model of state executive relations provides a way to
think about the discretion enjoyed by SAGs. Direct mechanisms for removing
the SAG, such as appointment and removal power, considerably reduce the
amount of effort necessary to overturn SAG policies of which the governor
disapproves, and thus reduces the degree of policy discretion enjoyed by the
SAG. But where, as in most states, direct mechanisms are not available to
governors for punishing SAGs, the SAGs enjoy a great deal of discretion.
Under the most common feature of state constitutional design, an election is the
primary vehicle through which the SAG can be removed from office.42 This

eliminates the most obvious constraint on the attorney general, which is the
ability of a hierarchically superior officer to remove him from office.
Despite this freedom from the threat of being replaced by the governor,
there is still the question of whether a governor may order an attorney general
to take a specific course of action. The ease with which a governor can punish a
SAG for failure to comply with an order determines whether the power to give
the SAG an order is a functionally viable check on the SAG's policy discretion.
A constitutional or statutory provision permitting a governor to control the
SAG could be enforceable either politically (if the electorate voted out an
attorney general who disobeyed a gubernatorial order) or judicially. Generally,
judicially enforceable checks on SAG discretion will be less costly and
therefore more effective than political checks. For example, where the governor
can seek a court order to compel the SAG to obey an order, the costs of
enforcing a gubernatorial order will be fairly low. 4 3 On the other hand, where
the governor's only recourse is to advocate for the electoral defeat of the
attorney general, the governor's influence over the attorney general will be

41. See e.g., McCubbins, et. al., supra note 40, at 435 (noting that the ability to appoint
administrators in the federal context gives the President greater influence over administrative
policy).
42. Recall that only forty-three of fifty states elect their state attorney general (see
Introduction, supra). In the remaining seven states, the attorney general will be more directly
accountable to the institutions that choose the officeholder.
43. See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482-83 (1981) (holding
that the governor retains the "supreme executive power" to determine the public interest in the
event of a conflict between the governor and the attorney general, and that the governor could
properly seek a court order enjoining the attorney general from representing interests adverse to
the governor).
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weaker and more uncertain.
In some states, the law is clear that the governor is not permitted to
interfere in the state's litigation strategy. 44 For example, in Massachusetts,
following the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision requiring the state to
offer marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 45 Governor Mitt Romney, a
Republican, sought to initiate litigation to encourage the court to stay its
decision pending the possible passage of a state constitutional amendment
banning same sex marriage. The attorney general, a Democrat, refused to
follow the governor's preferred course of action. Because Massachusetts law
was sufficiently clear as to the attorney general's monopolization of litigation
authority, the governor was forced to request from the legislature a specific
waiver granting him standing to sue in his own capacity. 46 The legislature
ultimately did not comply.
In another instance, in a case stemming from the redrawing of district
lines in Georgia after the 2000 census, a Republican governor took the state's
Democratic attorney general to the state supreme court over who had the right
to terminate litigation to which the state was a party.4 7 Following his election in
2002, the newly elected Republican governor ordered the reelected attorney
general to drop one of the state's appeals before the United States Supreme
48
When the attorney general refused, the governor sued. Even after the
Court.
U.S. Supreme Court had already ruled on the case,49 the Georgia Supreme
Court declined to find the issue moot, and instead issued an opinion upholding
the attorney general's authority to conduct litigation on the state's behalf
independent of the governor's wishes on the matter. 50
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the governor will often not be an
effective check on the SAG.5 1 However, the SAG can be constrained by actors
is
other than the governor. In many states the more effective institutional check 53
52
the legislature. As the Fifth Circuit in Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon

44. See, e.g., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1265-67 (1977) (holding that
the attorney general possesses ultimate authority over litigation).
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
45.
46. See Pam Belluck, Governor of Massachusetts Seeks to Delay Same-Sex Marriages,
NEW YORK TIMES, April 16, 2004, at A12.
47. See Perdue v. Baker, 586 S.E.2d 606, 607 (2003).
48. Id.
49. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1152 (2003).
50. The opinion stated that both offices had responsibility for determining the state's
litigation positions. See Perdue, 586 S.E.2d at 608. However, the opinion declined to offer any
legal devices through which the governor could assert this authority.
51.
For an overview of case law from various states regarding the allocation of power
between the SAG and the governor, see William Marshall, Break up the Presidency? Governors,
State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2453-68

(2006).
52. See Michael Signar, Constitutional Crisis in the Commonwealth: Resolving the
Conflict between Governors and Attorneys General, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 43 (2006), for an

CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 95:885

indicated, state legislatures can constrict the SAGs' powers. For example,
during the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, (see Part III, infra) the North
Carolina legislature passed a statute forbidding the state attorney general, a
Democrat and future governor, from filing suit against the tobacco
companies. 54
Another possible check on the SAGs' discretion is the partisan primary.
The nature of the two-party system is such that candidates for public office
have to sell themselves not only to the median voter in a general election, but
also to the median voter within a particular party during a primary election. The
median primary voter's preferences may differ substantially from the median
general election voter's preferences because political parties, by design, do not
represent the entire political spectrum of voter values. Therefore, SAGs may
have an incentive to curry favor with party leaders and party loyalists in order
to avoid a primary challenge and maximize fundraising in preparation for the
general election. In some cases, this needs to serve two masters-the primary
and general electorates-might prove to be a constraint on the SAGs'
discretion, particularly in states with a strong party leadership to whom the
attorney general is beholden. In addition, one might imagine that intraexecutive conflict would be reduced when the SAG and the governor share the
same party because of the governor's greater leverage over the other members
of his party. As such, a governor of the same party would have another more
informal means to check the power of the SAG. However, research examining
55
the tobacco litigation has not found support for this proposition.
This intra-governmental conflict can be a means through which other state
institutions such as the governor or legislature can impose costs on the attorney
general for failure to comply with an order, and it is also a process through
which the role of the attorney general in each state is clarified and defined. As
such, intra-governmental litigation as a strategy to discipline SAGs can entail
costs for the plaintiff-governors as well. In Georgia, for example, the state
supreme court upheld the exercise of independent authority by the attorney
general, making the SAG's legal authority clear. 56 Future bargaining between
the attorney general and other branches of the Georgia government will take
place in the shadow of the now-defined rights and status of the attorney
general.
More generally, it is variability in the types of institutional constraints
discussed in this Part that determine the amount of discretion that the SAG has
in setting his own policy goals. As it becomes more difficult or more costly for

argument that the Virginia legislature should establish a "Governor's counsel" in each state
agency in order to limit the influence of the SAG.
53. See Florida ex rel. Shevin, 526 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1976).
54. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE 164 (2002).
55. See Part III, infra.
56. See Perdue, 586 S.E.2d at 611-12.
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other branches to overturn SAG action, or as the SAGs' and other institutions'
policy preferences converge, the discretion of the SAG increases. By far the
most important factor in these institutional arrangements is independent
election, which greatly increases the SAGs' discretion to oppose other state
officers.
C. SAG Incentives to InitiateRegulatory Litigation
The policy discretion that results from state constitutional design permits
the attorney general to act in an entrepreneurial fashion. Assuming that the
attorney general is a self-interested politician seeking to maintain or advance
his political career, the attorney general has an incentive to drive policy change.
The median voter theorem provides a clear illustration of the way this incentive
functions. Under the median voter theorem, the proposal or candidate favored
by the median voter is the proposal or candidate that prevails. 57 In the case of
candidates, voters are likely to evaluate the candidate on a number of politically
salient policy positions. 58 Because the SAGs' primary role is to act as the
state's chief law enforcement officer, voters will likely evaluate a SAG
candidate largely on that basis. As such, a candidate for attorney general will
seek to impress the median voter (in either a primary or general election)
primarily on law enforcement or legal policy issues.
There is no reason, however, to think that the median voter on law
enforcement issues is the same as the median voter on issues such as taxation or
education. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that for offices with broader
responsibilities, such as governor, voters consider a combination of policy
positions in evaluating a candidate. 59 This means that an attorney general who
aspires to higher office, such as governor or U.S. Senator, has an incentive to
raise his profile in policy areas beyond that of law enforcement. By developing
a record in areas such as health care or securities regulation, an attorney general
can position himself to appeal to the median voter in an election for a higher
office. 60
Thus, the median voter theorem helps explain why SAGs would seek to
expand beyond simply law enforcement into other policy areas, despite the fact

57.

See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 25 (2000).

58. A candidate's profile is, of course, not simply created by his position on relevant
policies, but is also determined to some extent, perhaps to a high extent, by a personality profile.
However, a candidate's personal profile is irrelevant for the purposes of institutional analysis.
59. See, e.g., John R. Hibbing, Ambition in the House: Behavioral Consequences of
Higher Office Goals Among US. Representatives, 30 AM. J. POL. Scd. 651 (1986) (finding that
members of the U.S. House of Representatives running for the Senate adapt their behavior to
appeal to the constituency that they seek to represent).
60. Wayne L. Francis, Lawrence W. Kenny, Rebecca B. Morton & Amy B. Schmidt,
Retrospective Voting and PoliticalMobility, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 999, 1000 (1994) (presenting
evidence that candidates for higher office behave as if they expect voters for higher office to judge
them on their records in "lower" office).
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that in seeking higher office they are likely facing the same formal electorate.
Because moving to higher office involves capturing a median voter on a
multidimensional policy space, rather than the one-dimensional space in which
the SAG has already been successful, the SAG has an incentive to innovate
within the constraints imposed on his office.
One can also think about the SAGs' incentives in terms of interest groups.
The interest groups that are primarily affected by, and thus interested in, the
election of the SAG are going to be law enforcement organizations, state bar
associations, defense attorneys, and the like. 61 In contrast, many more interest
groups are going to be involved in higher profile state races, precisely because
a governor or a senator has a much broader range of policies within his ambit.
Thus, in seeking to raise money and build support in a bid for higher office, the
attorney general must try to reach out to interest groups that may not have a
direct interest in the attorney general's core function of law enforcement.
Building a coalition to win an election requires support from a range of
interests, and that support is presumably more easily assembled if one has a
record to run on, rather than mere statements.
D. Resource Constraints
Simply having an incentive to innovate is not a sufficient condition to
ensure that innovation will occur, nor is the absence of formal hierarchical
restraints.
To be successful policy entrepreneurs, SAGs must have the
organizational resources necessary to prosecute more than just the run-of-themill crimes, and the power to determine what cases are pursued. This point can
be illustrated by comparison with the federal judiciary. The writ of certiorari
gives the Supreme Court virtually complete discretion over its docket. 62 In
contrast, the federal appeals courts have mandatory jurisdiction over appeals
from the district courts. 63 The result is that, unlike the Supreme Court, the
federal appellate courts spend a large portion of their limited resources
correcting errors made in the district courts. 64 In contrast, the Supreme Court

61. This model can be complicated where political interest groups concerned with nonlaw enforcement issues into which a SAG expands anticipate either his innovation or his future
campaigns for higher office. In such situations, interest groups with little interest in the SAG
office may try to influence voters in SAG elections. Because most voters presumably choose a
SAG based on law enforcement issues, such political interest groups will try to frame a candidate
one way or another on law enforcement issues. However, the fact that their involvement is
motivated by non-law enforcement concerns means that such considerations can play a role in
SAG elections.
62.
Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus
Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 277 (2006) (noting that in
1988 Congress removed most of the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction).
63.
Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court
Supervision in the FederalJudiciary: A HierarchicalPerspective, 37 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 143,
145 (2003).
64. Id.
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can hear cases based on the issues that it feels are within its competence to
decide and in which it feels it can produce a practical result.
The ability of litigators or prosecutors to affect policy is subject to similar
resource considerations. Although prosecutors have largely unreviewable
discretion in terms of the cases that they bring, 65 this is not the same as having
the resources to bring any case they may wish to bring. A sample of cases in a
government lawyer's office might include routine criminal prosecutions,
defenses of state agencies, civil enforcement actions, and more novel
"regulatory cases." The greatest ability to determine policy is in civil
enforcement and regulatory cases, in which the government lawyer can
effectively exercise the power of selection. However, a small government
office could easily find itself without the resources to pursue these more
innovative claims. A local county prosecutor, for example, may be so
overwhelmed with standard criminal prosecutions that he or she lacks the
resources to file more innovative lawsuits. In effect, his or her "docket"
consumes the finite resources of the office and restricts his or her ability to
affect policy.
In contrast, SAGs have considerably more resources at their disposal.
Studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s indicated a huge increase in the size
of SAG offices and staffs. 66 The increase in organizational resources can
translate into greater discretion in how to use those resources. 67 SAGs have
also been quite creative in seeking to expand the resources at their disposal,
particularly by hiring outside counsel on a contingency fee basis. 68 This tactic
was particularly effective in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, in which
plaintiffs' law firms reinvested much of the money earned from asbestos
litigation into developing cases against the tobacco companies on behalf of the
SAGs who hired them. 69
SAGs are also less limited, relative to private attorneys, in their ability to
find an appropriate case to use as a vehicle to advance a policy agenda.7 °
Because their authority is predicated to some extent on the "public interest"
conception of their role that is embedded in the common law tradition, SAGs

65. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
227, 241 (2006) (noting that courts rarely if ever review prosecutors criminal charging decisions).
66. See Clayton, supra note 30, at 538.
67. Cf The Role of State Attorneys General in EnvironmentalRegulation, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 335, 342-43 (2005) (Maine Attorney General Stephen Rowe describes his office's
decision not to join an interstate environmental suit, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04
Civ. 5669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 2004) as "basically logistical. We saw it as
being resource intensive.").
68. See Derthick, supra note 54, at 164.
69. Id., at 73.
70. See, e.g., Stephen Paul Mahinka & Kathleen M. Sanzo, Multistate Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Investigations: Practical Concerns, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 213, 215 (1994)
(describing how states may pursue antitrust cases on their own behalf as direct purchasers, as well
as on behalf of their consumers under the parens patriae provisions of federal antitrust laws).
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are able to bring lawsuits with sweeping regulatory implications that private
71
litigants would be unable to bring for lack of standing or other legal reasons.
This was certainly the case with the tobacco litigation. Private efforts to sue the
tobacco companies had largely foundered both on the disparate resources that
the two parties possessed, as well as legal difficulties stemming from proving
causation between smoking a particular brand of cigarettes and the injuries
suffered, and overcoming contributory negligence doctrines such as
"assumption of risk.",72 The states were able to get around these difficulties by
asserting their own rights to compensation as healthcare providers. Similarly, in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., eight SAGs sued six power

companies, seeking injunctive relief to compel the defendants to reduce their
emission of greenhouse gases. 73 The suit presents a variety of standing issues,
most notably whether SAGs can, by invoking "parens patriae" standing,
circumvent standing limitations that would prevent citizen suits with similar
74
claims.
In sum, state constitutional design creates a unique institutional
environment that can encourage SAGs to pursue a litigation-based regulatory
agenda that is outside the normal purview of a law enforcement officer. A
constitutional design that removes formal hierarchical accountability within the
executive branch and gives a monopoly (or near monopoly) on litigation to the
SAG creates few formal institutional constraints on the SAGs' policy
discretion. A median voter or interest group model can be used to understand
the SAGs' incentives to innovate. A constitutional design that fragments
executive authority across multiple offices encourages elected officials to
infringe on each other's policy turf for political gain. Furthermore, as the next
Part will illustrate, other types of constraints that might be thought to operate,
such as resource constraints imposed in the budgeting process or party
discipline outside the scope of formal constitutional checks, seem to have little
effect on SAGs. 75 Instead, state constitutional arrangements generally give the
SAG a free hand to use litigation to engage in regulation.

III
TOBACCO LITIGATION:

A

CASE STUDY

In the following Part, I consider the state-based institutional and political

71.
Florida ex rel. Shevin, 526 F.2d 266, 268.
72. Derthick, supra note 54, at 32.
73. No. 04 Civ. 5669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 2004).
74. For a complete treatment of the standing issues presented by Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power. Co., see Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 293, 294 (2005).
75. See Part III, infra.
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constraints described in the preceding Part in the context of the tobacco
litigation of the 1990s, drawing on empirical research undertaken by political
scientists. I also introduce a preliminary discussion of national incentives for
state-based cooperation in multi-state litigation. A more complete discussion of
national incentives is deferred until Part IV.
A. SAG Lawsuits Against the Tobacco Companies
Tobacco litigation has come under enormous scrutiny in part for the same
reasons that the Supreme Court has on occasion resisted congressional efforts
76
to regulate the states: accountability.
Many commentators argue that a
settlement between the states and the tobacco companies, requiring the tobacco
companies to make payments into state treasuries based on their share of the
tobacco market,77 essentially an excise tax on tobacco products,7 8 amounts to
an end run around the legislative process. 79 Where, these scholars wonder, is
the democratic accountability when de facto taxes are levied through broad
sweeping settlements backed by the force of consent decrees? 80
The wave of tobacco litigation by states began in 1994 when Attorney
General Michael Moore of Mississippi filed the first lawsuit under the novel
theory that the state should be able to recover from the tobacco companies the
expenses paid from Medicaid funds on behalf of smokers. 81 Moore designed
this theory specifically to get around what had been a successful defense in
private suits against the tobacco companies, namely the tort doctrine of
"assumption of risk."' 82 Moore argued that because the state had never
assumed the risk of its citizens smoking, tobacco companies were unable to use
the "assumption of risk" defense.

76. See, e.g., Michael Dubow, RestrainingState Attorneys General, Curbing Government
Lawsuit Abuse, 437 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that the policies implemented by the
Master Settlement Agreement were more appropriately the products of legislative, rather than
judicial proceedings); Robert B. Reich, Don't Democrats Believe in Democracy? WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 12, 2000, at A22 (calling regulation through litigation "faux legislation, which sacrifices
democracy.").
77. The settlement also placed restrictions on certain advertising tactics, such as using
cartoons in advertisements for tobacco, or sponsoring public events such as concerts. See Nat'l
Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., Multistate Settlement with Tobacco Industry at
12,
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/msa.pdf (last visited January 8, 2007).
78. See W. Kip Viscusi, Tobacco: Regulation and Taxation Through Litigation, in
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 23 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (characterizing the tobacco
settlement as an excise tax on tobacco products).
79. See Derthick, supra note 54.
80. See Derthick, supra note 54, at 220.
81.
Thomas A. Schmeling, Stag Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation and
the Emergence of Cooperation Among State Attorneys General, 25 LAW & POL'Y 429, 431

(2003).
82. Derthick, supra note 54, at 75 ("[T]he state would ask to be indemnified, as an
innocent third party, for its medical expenditures on behalf of smokers.").
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As Mississippi's case cleared its preliminary hurdles, 83 other states began

to gain interest, leading to the filing of more suits. 84 Although certain states
resisted, other state legislatures actively encouraged the suits. In Florida, for
example, the state legislature amended the laws to virtually guarantee victory
for the state by removing the tobacco companies' defenses. 85 Specifically, the
Florida legislature removed all affirmative common law defenses normally

party, such as the assumption of risk defense and
available to a liable third
86
comparative negligence.

Four states, Mississippi, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Florida, were the
first to settle their cases. 87 However, as more states filed suits, there was a push
to reach a general settlement. 88 Negotiators for the states and the tobacco

companies reached such an agreement in 1997. 89 The 1997 settlement
contained extensive liability protections for the tobacco industry, and thus
91
90
required Congressional action. However, the settlement died in Congress.

Congressional defeat was assured by the fact that a number of interests not
represented in the initial state-industry negotiations were now admitted to the
congressional bargaining process. 92 These interests included trial lawyers

unhappy about the curtailing of future liability, activists who felt that the
settlement did not go far enough, and tobacco farmers who stood to lose
financially from reduced consumption of tobacco. 93 The result was legislative

deadlock. In effect, the ball was back in the SAGs' court.

83. Those hurdles included a petition from the Governor to the state supreme court
claiming that the attorney general lacked the authority to litigate on behalf of the state without an
agency client, a claim which was later successful in West Virginia. See Derthick, supra note 54, at
79.
84. Schmeling, supra note 81, at 431, 433 (noting that West Virginia and Minnesota filed
suits similar to Mississippi's suit later in 1994, and that 42 states filed within 4 years of the initial
suit).
85. Derthick, supra note 54, at 79.
86. Id.
87. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 94-251, § 4 (C.S.S.B. 2110) (West) (amending §
409.910(1) Fla. Stat. to read "Principles of common law and equity as to assignment, lien,
subrogation, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other affmnative defenses
normally available to a liable third party are to be abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full
recovery by Medicaid from third party resources").
88. Id.
89. Derthick, supra note 54, at 83.
90. Id. at 84.
91.
David S. Samford, Cutting Deals in Smoke-Free Rooms: A Case Study in Public
Choice Theory, 87 KY. L.J. 845, 846 (1999). On June 17, 1998, the Senate voted on a cloture
motion, seeking to end debate on Senate Bill 1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act. The
vote failed by a vote 57-42 in favor (60 votes are needed to pass a cloture motion), and thus the
initial settlement failed to win congressional approval. Id.
92. Id. at 865-77 (describing the interest groups that participated in the Congressional
negotiations over the 1997 settlement, and noting that that interests such as those of tobacco
growers were initially excluded only to be added in to the final version of the bill), Derthick,
supra note 54, at 143.
93. Id.
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The state legislatures then began to pressure their SAGs to complete a
deal that would be a huge boon for state treasuries. 94 On the other side, tobacco
companies were hungry for the certainty that would come with a settlement
extinguishing their liability to the states. 95 The result was the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) reached in 1998, which required a combination of consent
decrees from the various courts in which litigation was pending, as well as
action by the state legislatures. 96 Eager for the financial windfall, the
legislatures enacted the relevant pieces of the agreement, which, by pegging
payments from tobacco companies to market share, gave the states an
indirect
97
companies.
tobacco
the
of
solvency
financial
the
protecting
in
interest
B. Key FactorsDriving SAGs to File Suit
There are two studies that attempt to use time series data to analyze the
factors that caused SAGs to file suit against the tobacco companies. The earlier
study, conducted by Spill, Licari, and Ray, emphasizes state-based constraints
(discussed in Part II supra).98 The authors found that Democratic SAGs are
more likely to file suit than Republican SAGs, although the probability of a
Republican filing suit approaches that of a Democrat asymptotically over
time. 99 Furthermore, their findings suggest that the political affiliation of the
governor is not significant. 100 While they had postulated that Republican
governors might act as a constraint on Democratic SAGs, either through direct
pressure or through control of the budgetary process, they find that SAGs tend
to operate independently of the party affiliation of the governor.101
Additionally, the authors found that SAGs were responsive to the expected
value of the payout, measured by the likelihood of success at any given point in
time (the public goods aspect of the tobacco litigation) and the amount of
money the state stood to gain from Medicaid reimbursements. 10 2 Moreover,
tobacco production in the state seemed to act as a drag on states' desire to
file. 103
Thomas Schmeling's more recent study focuses specifically on the public
good aspect of the tobacco litigation, inquiring into the ways in which the

94.
95.

Derthick, supra note 54, at 172.
Id. at 170 (noting that the tobacco industry had always wanted a comprehensive

settlement).
96. Id. at 182.
97. Id. at 197.
98. See Rorie L. Spill, Michael J. Licari, & Leonard Ray, Taking on Tobacco: Policy
Entrepreneurshipand the Tobacco Litigation. 54 POL. RES. Q. 605 (2001).

99.
100.

See id. at 615, 618.
See id. at 615-16.

101.
102.
103.

Id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 617.
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decision-making processes of the different SAGs' were interdependent. 04 He
begins from the proposition that the SAGs never hoped to recover in a series of
jury verdicts, but rather hoped to bring the industry to the bargaining table
through the collective application of pressure. 1 5 Arguing that the free-rider
problem endemic to public goods should have prevented SAGs from filing a
potentially risky suit in support of the efforts of other SAGs,' 0 6 Schmeling
rejects the idea that selective benefits in the form of personal political benefits
helped solve the collective action problem. 107 Instead, Schmeling argues that
the selective benefit the SAGs received was the increased probability of forcing
a settlement. 0 8 In other words, as the number of states filing suit against the
tobacco companies increased, the odds that the tobacco companies would seek
a broad settlement became higher. While free riding would be a problem when
only a few states had filed, and thus the probability of a settlement was low,
and at the end when the probability of settlement was very high, 0 9 individual
states have the opportunity to have a meaningful impact on the production of a
public good from which they all benefit in the middle part of the litigation
process.' 10 Thus, once a certain number of states have filed suit, the collective
action problem is solved because it is individually rational for new states to file
suit.
The question then becomes why the initial states filed suit. The answer,
Schmeling suggests, is the heterogeneity with respect to the value and cost of
contribution among the states. 11 In other words, the cost of producing an
increase in the probability of a settlement varies from state to state, as does the
expected return from investing the resources necessary to file suit. Those states
with low costs to filing suit (in terms of state-based institutional or political
constraints) and high expected returns can make the initial investment, which
increases the likelihood of an overall settlement. This increase in the likelihood
of an overall settlement increases the expected
return from filing suit for those
2
SAGs for whom the cost of filing is higher. "
Schmeling's study reintroduces the political, legal, and institutional

104.
105.
106.

Schmeling, supra note 81, at 429.
Id. at 432.
For an analysis of public goods, see generally MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF

COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).

107. Schmeling, supra note 81, at 436. ("It is not at all clear that any political benefits
flowed from the suits..
108. Id. at 439.
109. To limit their future liability, the tobacco companies insisted that all states be party to
the settlement, thus negating the need for those states that had not yet filed to do so. See
Schmeling, supra note 81, at 435.
110. Schmeling, supra note 81, at 439.
111. Id. at440
112. Id. (discussing how an increase in the probability of creating a public good, in this
case a settlement, increases the likelihood of contributing to the creation of the public good, i.e.,
filing suit).
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determinants that are otherwise lacking in his account of the tobacco litigation.
While his statistical findings privilege the notion of interdependence-that the
production function of the public good depends on the action of multiple
SAGs-Schmeling does find, similar to Spill, Licari, and Ray, that the party of
the SAG and the expected value of participation in terms of Medicaid
expenditures and economic harm to an indigenous tobacco industry have an
effect on the decision to file as well. 113 Thus, while Schemling's theory is
driven by the external effects that the SAGs have on each other, his results
leave room for state-based factors to explain the observed variation in SAG
behavior.
This heterogeneity thesis demands closer examination, because it is only
half correct. As Professor Martha Derthick notes, SAG cooperation was made
possible by the nationalization of interest groups and the increased
homogenization of policy preferences and politics across state and regional
boundaries. 14 In other words, median voters or interest group politics were
sufficiently similar across state and regional boundaries that tobacco regulation
was widely perceived as a public good worth pursuing. This suggests an
interesting conclusion. While heterogeneity of cost structures ( i.e., variation in
state institutional constraints) may be necessary for the initial investment to
occur, a certain homogeneity of political preferences may be necessary to
induce cooperation. If the variation in political conditions is too large, the value
of creating a public good will not be sufficiently great to induce enough SAGs
to participate in the litigation, regardless of the certainty that the public good
will be produced. Under these conditions, cooperation will falter.
Thus, the example of tobacco suggests that in creating the conditions for
cooperation, there is an optimal amount of variation in state institutional and
political constraints. Too much political variation will render cooperation
impossible, but too little institutional variation may prevent initiation of policy
innovation by those with the lowest costs to initial investment. Furthermore,
although a certain degree of homogeneity of political constraints will always be
relevant as a condition for cooperation, heterogeneity of institutional
constraints may not be necessary if everyone's costs to production are
sufficiently low.
More generally, the tobacco litigation illustrates the conditions under
which SAGs can use litigation as an effective regulatory tool against private
industry. In order to press a national industry into a settlement with the states,
multiple states will have to coordinate their litigation positions, thus raising the
potential liability of the industry in question. Variation in state institutions can
be important in jump-starting cooperation because not all states will be
similarly situated with respect to their interest in or ability to pursue a

113.
114.

Id. at442-43.
Derthick, supra note 54, at 106.
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regulatory lawsuit. However, once a cooperative effort has begun, there must
be a sufficiently high degree of political support across states for the regulatory
litigation's stated objectives to induce more SAGs to join the effort.
Furthermore, as Part IV explains in greater detail, the effects produced by
regulatory litigation can induce both greater cooperation among SAGs as well
as greater regulation from federal agencies.
IV
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND THE INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION

In this Part, I explicate in greater detail the incentives for SAGs to
cooperate with each other at the federal level, and the institutions that they have
created to assist in this cooperation. I also consider how states decide whether
to pursue a single case or multiple cases in multiple courts, as well as the
competitive relationship that can exist between SAGs and federal regulatory
agencies.
A. Constraintsand Incentives to Join in Multi-State Litigation

While state constitutional constraints on SAG litigation are fairly limited,
SAGs can impose constraints on, and create incentives for, each other when
they engage in regulatory or political litigation with interstate ramifications.
Litigation by a single SAG or a group of SAGs can create externalized costs
and benefits, which in turn give SAGs a strong incentive to coordinate their
activities in areas of overlapping concern. From the perspective of SAGs, these
costs come in two forms. First, regulatory spillover, when policies in one state
15
have effects in one or more other states, can create public costs and benefits.
Second, the SAGs' level of control over these forces and their impact on the
SAGs' home state can have personal political consequences in terms of the
SAG's potential to hold onto his or her office, or obtain higher office.
Combined with the relative freedom provided by state institutions discussed in
Part II, the model here explains the factors driving cooperation among SAGs
and how federalism can produce a regulatory regime through a system of
decentralized competition between SAGs and the federal government.
Regulatory spillovers create a strong incentive for SAGs to coordinate
their efforts. These spillovers, or externalities, have two basic sources: the
collateral effects of legal rulings and the political "bandwagon effect." With
respect to the first, legal rulings that resolve the permissibility (on either
constitutional or statutory grounds) of any state or federal law, regulation, or
interpretation of either a law or regulation, can resolve that issue in every state.
For example, in S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental

115.

In the language of economics, these costs are negative and positive externalities. See

COOTER, supra note 57, at 106.
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Protection,116 Thirty-three states submitted an amicus brief arguing that the
ability of states to regulate the construction and operation of hydroelectric
plants was not preempted by federal legislation. 117 Although the specific facts
of the case involve Maine, the legal issue affects many, if not all, states. In such
cases, the incentive for SAGs to coordinate and cooperate is obvious. Because
the effects of a court decision may be national, there is greater reason for SAGs
to be involved in order to influence the outcome. This helps explain the
participation of SAGs as amici curiae, as well as the fact that, after the Solicitor
are the entity that appears most
General's office, the SAGs collectively
8
Court."
Supreme
the
before
frequently
With respect to the bandwagon effect, the incentives are a bit more
complicated. The bandwagon effect is when multiple SAGs join a particular
litigation effort. When these lawsuits are between the states and private
industries, these lawsuits are the classic examples of regulation through
litigation. States seek to use their advantage in court, particularly their own
courts, to obtain a regulatory outcome in a particular industry. The tobacco
cases of the 1990s are the clearest example of this type of effort, 1 9 although
the ongoing environmental litigation is also significant. 12 As Connecticut
Attorney General Blumenthal said of Connecticut v. American Electric Power
trying
Co., "[W]e are seeking relief that includes no money damages... We're
12
to change the way the [electric power plant] industry does business."' '
The decision as to whether or not to join a regulatory effort that other
SAGs have begun will likely be subject to a cost-benefit calculation. It is in
making these decisions that the variation in state institutions discussed above
will have the most impact. The greater the constraints placed on the attorney
general from within the state, the less free he is to respond to pressures from
outside the state. In other words, the range of the SAGs' discretion, determined
in part by the variation in state institutional constraints, determines the freedom
that a SAG has to join a multi-state suit. For example, during the tobacco
litigation, eight states refrained from filing suit against the tobacco
companies.
Many of these states were major tobacco producers and thus
expected to be hurt by the success of suits against tobacco companies. 23 In the
case of North Carolina, the Legislature forbade the attorney general by statute

116.
126 S. Ct. 1843 (2006).
117. Id. at 1853 ("Changes in the river . . . fall within a state's legitimate legislative
business and the Clean Water Act provides for a system that respects the states' concerns.").
118. Clayton, supra note 30, at 533.
119. See Derthick, supra note 54, see also Robert Kagan and William Nelson, The Politics
of Tobacco Regulation in the United States, in REGULATING TOBACCO (2001).
120. See The Role ofAttorneys General,supra note 8.
121.
Id. at 340.
122. The eight states were Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Wyoming, and Virginia. See Schmeling, supra note 81, at 435.
123. Deathrick, supra note 54, at 163.
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from filing. 124 Similarly, Maine Attorney General Stephen Rowe stated that the
reason that his office did not join Connecticut's suit against Midwest power
' 25
plants was "basically logistical. We saw it as being resource intensive."'
Because his office lacked the resources to pursue a novel environmental claim
in conjunction with its priorities, it could not join a suit in which it might
otherwise have participated.
There comes a point, however, at which withholding participation in order
to prevent state-based costs ceases to be a strong strategy. When it became
clear that the SAGs' efforts to regulate tobacco were going to result in a de
facto tax on tobacco products, even states such as North Carolina joined in the
settlement (although it did so without ever filing suit). 126 Once the actions of
other states ensured that the harm to the tobacco industry was certain to occur,
and only the magnitude and distribution of monetary payments remained to be
determined, there was little point in the state refusing to pursue a settlement
27
with the tobacco companies.'
The role of the judiciary in these cases is particularly important. In effect,
the .courts create a forum in which SAGs can pursue regulation through
litigation. By bringing suit in multiple courts and multiple court systems, the
SAGs can raise the expected cost of defending against this litigation to
potentially astronomical heights. 128 When this type of parallel coordinated
litigation occurs, the SAGs need not prevail on every front. They merely need
to prevail in enough courts to threaten their target with future liability in other
courts in which they are not currently facing suit, or in which they have
29
previously prevailed on related claims. 1
Of course, multiple lawsuits increase the coordination problems. An
alternative strategy is to file a single suit with multiple plaintiffs in federal
district or state trial court. With access to fifty different state systems and
twelve federal circuits, SAGs are collectively able to forum-shop for the venue
that is most appropriate for their case. Connecticut and its partner states have
adopted this alternative strategy in their ongoing environmental litigation.'1 30 As
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal said, "We're also lucky

124. Id. at 172.
125.
The Role ofAttorneys General, supra note 8, at 342-43.
126. Derthick, supra note 54, at 172 ("North Carolina . . . had the choice of either
participating and having its consumers of cigarettes pay higher prices while the state received a
share of the new revenue, or not participating, in which case its consumers would still pay the
higher prices but the state government would receive nothing.").
127. Schmeling, supra note 81, at 435.
128. Id. at 433 ("[T]he prospect of fifty state governments filing suit at once would alter the
calculations of risk to the companies. In 1996 alone, the [tobacco] industry was estimated to have
spent $600 million on legal fees, without having taken one case to trial.").
129. Derthick, supra note 54, at 170 (noting that the tobacco companies actually prevailed
in a number of the suits brought by states).
130. The Role ofAttorneys General,supra note 8, at 346.
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because we're in one court ... [f]or tobacco, we were in 50 different states, 50
different courts, so we had to make sure that one state wasn't saying something
1 31
that would hurt another state ... here the coordination problem is better."
The decision to pursue multiple litigations versus a single litigation will
be based on factors related not only to coordination costs, but also to the
expected return from investing resources in a case. 13 2 For example, the
innovation that made the tobacco litigation possible was primarily legal. The
states were able to avoid the tobacco companies' "assumption of risk" and
contributory negligence defenses by asserting their own rights as health care
providers. Because they were seeking monetary damages, the states were able
to increase the expected cost of the lawsuits through filing in multiple courts.133
Furthermore, states were able to benefit from the scientific research the tobacco
companies themselves had done. 134 In contrast, where, as in Connecticut vs.
American Electric Power Co., damages are not being sought, there is not the
financial incentive to litigate in multiple courts. The savings from pooled
resources outweighs the benefits from being in multiple courts.
Faced with this need to coordinate their activities, it should come as no
surprise that SAGs have their own national organization, the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). NAAG was originally founded in
1907, but in the last twenty-five years it has become an increasingly significant
player in the national regulatory scene. 135 Although it provides a variety of
functions to its members, including moot court preparation for Supreme Court
appearances and a lobbying presence in Washington, the most important
function that NAAG performs is coordinating litigation positions between
states.' 36 Through a series of policy-specific projects, NAAG encourages the
37
centralization of litigation projects in areas of overlapping interest to SAGs. 1
Furthermore, NAAG provides a central body to encourage other SAGs to join a
lawsuit. 138 For example, in 1992, NAAG was successful in persuading fortynine states and the District of Columbia to file amicus briefs in support of
Wisconsin's hate crime legislation, which was facing a First Amendment
39
challenge. 1
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133. See supra Part III.
134. Katherine Culliton, The Impact of Alcohol and Tobacco Advertising on the Latino
Community as a Civil Rights Issue, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 71, 104 (2005).
135. Clayton, supra note 30, at 540.
136. See generally Clayton, supra note 30.
137.

Id.

138.
139.

Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543.

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 95:885

B. SAGs and the Federal "Regulation Gap"

A number of scholars have suggested that federal regulatory retrenchment,
or, in other words, the reduction of federal regulation and oversight of private
industry, is the cause of the increased activity of the SAGs over the last twentyfive years. 140 This argument suggests that SAG discretion to regulate depends
on federal regulatory preferences and constraints on federal action. To translate
this argument into the framework employed in this Comment, state discretion
to regulate an activity or industry can be thought of using the same spatial
14 1
model that was used to explain SAG discretion with respect to state actors.
The more difficult it is for Congress and federal agencies to regulate an activity
or to preempt state regulation of that activity, or the less they are inclined to do
so, the more discretion the states will enjoy. In other words, SAG activism may
be caused not only by a federal preference for reduced federal regulation, but
by judicially-imposed limits on federal power that create a regulatory gap, as
well as intra-state dynamics such as states' increasing need to regulate
industries on the cheap, and the inchoate public demand for regulation of
certain industries on which SAGs are able to capitalize.
Thus, federal regulatory strategies (chosen in light of political preferences
and legal constraints) and political entrepreneurialism do explain why states
have targeted particular industries, namely those in which there was a public
demand for regulation left unfulfilled by federal regulators. For example,
former New York Attorney General (now Governor) Eliot Spitzer's aggressive
campaign against Wall Street firms was made possible in large part by the lax
42
regulatory stance taken by the SEC during Harvey Pitt's tenure as Chairman.1
Likewise, the tobacco litigation followed a failed attempt by the FDA to
introduce more stringent regulations, 143 and the current environmental suits
were prompted in part by the regulatory space created
by the EPA's
44
interpretation of the Clean Air Act as not covering CO 2.1
The SAGs' ability to use litigation to regulate industries can also spur
federal action. To illustrate, following both the SAGs' success against the
tobacco companies in the 1990s and Eliot Spitzer's success against Wall Street
in the wake of the Enron scandal, federal agencies responded by upping their
enforcement efforts. The Justice Department sued the tobacco companies on
behalf of the federal government,145 and the SEC increased its policing of
corporate malfeasance. 46 Thus, SAGs can create regulation through mutual
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cooperation, but they can also promote regulation through competition with
federal regulators.
In sum, state attorneys general face not only state-based institutional
constraints, but a number of constraints from the structure of the federal
system. The nature of the legal and political environment in the United States
means that the actions of an individual SAG will frequently have ramifications
for other states, and thus for other SAGs. In an attempt to manage these
externalities, SAGs increasingly cooperate and coordinate their actions, as
evidenced by the rise of the NAAG as a centralizing force. This coordination
has allowed the SAGs to pursue a more aggressive regulatory agenda, but has
also introduced costs associated with coordinating so many disparate actors and
interests. Finally, the SAGs operate in a policy space that is also occupied by
the federal government and its various agencies. Regulatory space left by the
federal government will often determine where the SAGs' regulatory
opportunities lie, and SAG regulation in those areas may in turn prompt greater
federal regulation in the same areas. Thus, the SAGs are not only
complementary to, but competitive with, federal regulators.
V
FEDERALISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN TENSION

As the tobacco case illustrates, the fact that Congress or federal agencies
do not, for either political or legal reasons, enact a strong regulatory program
does not necessarily mean that a nationwide regulatory regime will not emerge.
This Comment has argued that the unique institutional structures within which
SAGs operate, both at the state and federal levels, under certain circumstances
foster cooperation between the states that can result in nationwide regulation
even in the absence of federal action. This phenomenon coincides with, and
may to some extent be caused by, the revival of judicially enforced limits on
federal power, which are predicated in part on the idea that federal regulation
can in some situations be insufficiently accountable to the people.
What this Comment suggests, and the tobacco litigation example
illustrates, is that the justifications for judicially-enforced limits on federal
power should reflect a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which the
states and the federal government interact with each other. In New York v.
United States, 147 which gives us the strongest statement of the Supreme Court's
accountability argument, the Court invalidated, on the grounds that it usurped
the proper role of the states, provisions of a state-negotiated and
Congressionally-enacted pact requiring states under certain circumstances to
take title to low-level radioactive waste. 148 The act at issue in New York, based
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149
largely on a proposal submitted by the National Governors' Association,
bears a startling resemblance to the initial 1997 tobacco settlement, which
Congress declined to enact, in that both were failed attempts by state
governments to use federal law to enhance their ability to cooperate.
The question posed at the beginning of this paper was whether state
cooperation that did not require Congressional action, such as in the tobacco
litigation, undermines the justification for negating compacts like the nuclear
waste compact in New York. If states find other ways to pass regional or
nationwide regulations that do not require Congressional involvement, does
blocking such agreements create greater political accountability to voters, as
the Supreme Court has suggested? Indeed, some commentators have suggested
that regulation by litigation is bad precisely because it undermines democratic
accountability. 150 With fewer interests involved in the bargaining process, the
public's desires may be frustrated.
SAG cooperation presents at least one accountability problem that does
not appear with Congressional regulation: the negative externalities that states
impose on each other. If states such as North Carolina do not wish to burden
the tobacco companies with extra financial obligations and legal liability, they
must not only prevail in Congress, but they must prevent cooperation among
the SAGs as well. In regulatory litigation, however, holdouts have little power.
A group of states targeting an industry does not need the permission of other
states whom the lawsuit impacts. Because an industry will often find it cheaper
to change its national operations rather than its operations in only a group of
states, lawsuits seeking to change the way in which businesses operate can have
national effects without national input. 151 Furthermore, unlike in a legislative
environment where bargaining can give holdouts or minorities some influence
over policies they oppose, the power of a single state to bargain directly with
institutions in other states is limited. There is therefore no built-in check to
preserve the integrity of decisions by voters of a single state to dissent from the
norm.
Judicially-enforced limits on federal power, whatever their rationale, can
make nationwide regulatory schemes more difficult to enact. However, if a
demand for regulation exists among the public, there is an incentive for
politicians to provide regulation. If the transaction costs of providing the
regulation at the federal level are too high, either because there are too many
competing interests with which to bargain, a single interest is powerful enough
to block the regulation, or because of judicial review of regulation, then other
political actors have an incentive to provide that regulation. As the tobacco case
study illustrates, SAG cooperation can produce regulation with much lower
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transaction costs than legislatures. Because at most fifty people, and in practice
many fewer, 152 need to agree to pursue a regulatory agenda, and because those
fifty people are responsible to largely separate institutional structures,
cooperation can emerge if an issue is conducive to regulation through litigation.
The externalities that SAGs can impose on other states mean that the
overall accountability of the regulatory scheme is reduced. In order for
accountability to be a coherent justification for federalism, it must increase the
ability of individual voters to influence public policies that have a direct impact
on them. To the extent that cooperative SAG litigation can enact regulatory
schemes that affect other states involuntarily, and to the extent that such actions
occur in response to a lack of federal regulation, judicially-enforced limits on
federal regulation can actually undermine their stated justification of supporting
federalism. Although state governments as a whole may benefit from the
protection, individual voters may be left vulnerable to externalities that are not
taken into account in the joint political market. In effect, judicially-imposed
federalism will in some circumstances substitute a judicial market for
regulation for a legislative market. In other words, if lawsuits can be used to
regulate the operation of industries, either through multi-million dollar damage
awards payable to state treasuries or through an injunction or consent decree
requiring the abatement of certain business practices, regulation will
increasingly emerge from the courtroom rather than from Congress. This
outcome harms accountability because the judiciary is, by design, less
responsive to concerns not represented by parties immediately before it.
To return to the tobacco example, the Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA) essentially levied a tax on tobacco products across the nation. States
like North Carolina could not avoid the tax, and so logic dictated that they at
least participate in the profits from the tax. This result calls into question
whether leaving the states to regulate themselves actually protects the choices
of individual states, or whether it simply protects the states from federal
regulation. North Carolinians basically had the issue decided for them by SAGs
from other states, institutions over which they had no influence. In Congress, at
least, North Carolina's representatives might have been able to exercise some
degree of influence.
While at first blush these regulatory spillovers seem as if they could
implicate the Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which
places limits on states' ability to regulate interstate commerce, in fact the
Dormant Commerce Clause is of little use in checking interstate regulation
effected through regulatory litigation. The Dormant Commerce Clause can only
properly be applied to state laws. 153 Regulatory litigation by SAGs predicated
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on constitutional state laws cannot be challenged, only the law themselves.'
Thus, if the regulatory objectives of potentially unconstitutional (on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds) legislation can be achieved through regulatory
litigation, the regulation can be insulated from federal judicial review. This
ability to accomplish state regulatory objectives without federal policing of
state regulation of interstate commerce gives states an incentive to shift
regulation from the legislature to the SAG, a move that further reduces
accountability, albeit at the state level.
Regulatory litigation by SAGs also reduces accountability to the public
over time. As Professor Robert Kagan has noted, regulation accomplished
55
through litigation is considerably less flexible than other types of regulation. 1
Regulatory regimes passed by statute or administrative regulation can be
overturned through a new statute or regulation. The fact that legislation can
always be undone by the same body that initially enacted it distinguishes it
from regulatory litigation. In the case of SAG litigation, settlements backed by
the force of consent decrees create judicially enforceable rights, thus giving
every player a veto over the revision of the settlements. 156 This creates a
familiar holdout problem, in which bargaining to a Pareto-improving solution
(i.e., a solution in which no party is worse off and at least one party is better off
than under the status quo) can be blocked by the requirement of unanimity.
The result is that regulation accomplished through litigation cannot be
easily amended or undone when it no longer fits the public's policy interests.
This problem is the reverse of the transaction costs argument that explains how
regulatory litigation occurs. While the transaction costs of accomplishing the
litigation initially are lower than the transaction costs of accomplishing the
same purpose in a legislative format, the costs of undoing the resulting
regulation are extremely high. Higher transaction costs of overturning
regulation necessarily reduce accountability by reducing the responsiveness of
regulatory schemes to political will.
Additionally, compliance with regulatory schemes stemming from
litigation may be considerably more difficult to obtain than compliance with
other types of regulatory schemes. Parties left outside of the bargaining process
are unlikely to abide by the settlement terms, and litigators will often be unable
to get the involvement of all of the relevant parties even if they want to. In the
instance of tobacco, for example, following the MSA a number of small
tobacco producers began producing cigarettes that cut into the market share of
the big tobacco companies.1 57 Although state laws enacted pursuant to the
MSA purported to constrain tobacco producers who were not party to the MSA,
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in reality enforcement is extremely costly.
It may be objected that SAGs will only cooperate in instances in which
they are converging on best practices. Regulation that emerges through this
cooperative process will enjoy a presumption of superiority because it has been
adopted by a number of different entities. Those regulatory policies that are not
superior will not be adopted by other states, and state-based innovation will
lead to an improvement over centrally imposed solutions. Indeed, the argument
that states act as laboratories for experimenting with, and perfecting policies,
has often been advanced as a justification for federalism. 158
The incentive-structures that influence policymaking by SAGs undercut
the "states as laboratories" argument. Under this argument, state-level
innovation and cooperation aimed at diffusing such innovation should lead to
the adoption of optimal policies. States should mimic those policies of other
states that are particularly effective or efficient. However, SAGs are not
necessarily responding to general efficiency concerns. Instead, as argued in the
body of this Comment, SAG action is incentivized and constrained by
institutions that are responding to political pressures, and SAGs are not immune
to personal political considerations. There is also an element of path
dependence to regulation by litigation. As Schmeling's production function
demonstrates, the benefits of joining in a regulatory lawsuit increase as more
states join the effort. Thus, the regulatory scheme that is first imposed may not
necessarily have been the best, but other SAGs can be induced to join by the
high likelihood of success of the initial regulatory scheme. Finally, the fact that
regulation by litigation is more difficult to overturn means that once it has been
accomplished, new alternatives and solutions are far more likely to be blocked.
The result is that political accountability suffers.
In sum, cooperative outcomes may actually undermine accountability
insofar as unanimity is not required and bargaining across issues is more
difficult than in a legislative context. Furthermore, the nature of regulatory
litigation prevents accountability because it is less responsive to the shifting
preferences of the electorate. Lastly, the fact that SAGs respond to individual
incentives and constraints rather than efficiency concerns means that the
regulatory policies they develop are not necessarily going to be superior to the
status quo. Thus, the institutional and political constraints operating on
individual state officers may cause the adoption of policies that cannot easily be
amended if a broader set of interests subsequently wants to overturn the results
of regulation through litigation.
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CONCLUSION

A central tenet of American democracy has always been the
accountability of elected officials to voters. The Founding Fathers designed a
dual system of separated powers to check political leaders' ability to exercise
power that was not responsive to a plurality of interests. Power was divided
between the three branches of the federal government, and between the federal
government and the state governments. Over time, however, power
increasingly has become concentrated in the federal government. As a
response, the Supreme Court has attempted to resurrect judicially enforceable
limits on federal regulation and the preemption of state power. The result has
been increased transaction costs to certain types of federal regulation in the
name of promoting democratic accountability.
However, greater accountability has not necessarily been achieved. Higher
transaction costs to regulation at the federal level give greater discretion to state
actors to produce their own regulation. State institutions with considerably
lower transaction costs to regulation have been able to fill the regulatory void
left by the federal government. Specifically, a number of institutional factors
have combined to make collaboration in regulation through litigation possible
among state attorneys general. This cooperation has led to de facto regulation
of a number of industries on a nationwide scale, but the subsequent
responsiveness of that regulation to political pressure is reduced by the unique
institutions that have shaped it. Furthermore, both the process and the end result
of these regulatory efforts call into question whether the accountability
rationale is sustainable as a justification for judicially-enforced limits on
federalism. State governments, by constitutional design, are considerably more
fragmented than the federal government. The result is that individual actors
such as the SAGs can have a huge effect in not only their own state, but the
entire nation, while remaining "accountable" to only a small portion of the
electorate. Such relatively unaccountable regulation is presumably not what the
Supreme Court had in mind when it began policing the powers of the federal
government.

